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Widespread in broadband markets
– increasing popularity in fixed voice markets
Strong support from 
– policy-makers (e.g. OECD)
• increased uptake, usage of internet access under flat-rate PSTN tariffs
– consumers
• ‘insurance’ from unexpectedly high usage fees  (Mb usage unknown)
• very high volume users (subsidy from low-volume users)
– operators
• predictable income streams (especially for new entrants)
• appropriate surplus from risk-averse/uninformed consumers
LIMITATIONS (I) – WELFARE AND UPTAKE
Flat-rate tariffs prioritise welfare from more usage over 
welfare from more connections
– users consume until marginal benefit of usage is zero, not 
marginal cost
• usage below marginal cost is ‘subsidised’
– ‘average’ flat-rate tariff prices low-volume users out of the 
market, even though the value of their use is higher than that 
usage the flat-rate tariff induces from subsidised (high-
volume) usage
Flat rate broadband tariffs thus depress the rate of 
broadband connection purchase
– relative to a two-part tariff

LIMITATIONS (II) - STRATEGIC
What to do when average consumption increases?
– network operators ultimately bear costs of demand variation
– flat-rate tariffs accelerate rate at which risks crystalise
Broadband usage is not costless
– CONGESTION!!!!
• consumers insulated from price variations, but bear quality degradation
– ultimately network upgrades required => costs increase
Increase flat-rate tariff?
– costs increase, revenues decrease as low-valuing consumers 
exit 
Set  two-part tariff?
– also cannibalises revenues if median usage is less than average 
from which flat-rate tariff derives
SOLUTION (I) - INTERIM
Two-part tariffs enable the practice of a form of price 
discrimination
– connection, usage sold in a bundle
– menus enable self-selection into tariffs by usage volume
How to engage in price discrimination using another 
metric?
– invest in increased connection speed – segregates users on 
value of the internet connection based on value of time
• high time-valuers (demand-inelastic) substitute to faster 
connections
• low time-valuers (often high-volume, price-elastic users)stay on 
congested slower connections
• can continue to price faster connections at flat rate at a high 
premium 
• although cycle repeats 
FASTER CONNECTIONS A SUPPLY-SIDE 
(NOT DEMAND-SIDE IMPERATIVE) DRIVEN 
BY FLAT-RATE TARIFF STRUCTURES
US – Pew Internet Survey 2008; OECD 2009
– only 33% of households purchase a connection faster than their 
operator’s standard speed connection
– willingness to pay a price premium low – revenues per connection 
from premium speeds only 1.2 times standard speed, despite very 
high speeds being sold at multiples of 4 to 7 times standard speeds
– applications used differ very little between ‘fast’ and ‘standard’ 
households
Limits to selling faster and faster connections to existing 
consumers
– will eventually stop substituting unless new applications emerge
LIKELY DEMAND CURVE FOR FAST 
BROADBAND
THE SOLUTION (II) - SUSTAINABLE
The new ‘low-hanging fruit’ is non-internet and low-
valuing users 
Two-part tariffs
– fixed fee to connect and ‘buckets of megabytes
– but only at the ‘slow’ ‘low valuing’ end of the market
Competitive incentives
– as long as demand is asymmetrically distributed, an entrant 
can charge a two-part tariff that will attract low-volume users 
away from incumbents  (adverse selection)
– incumbents left only with (relatively) higher-cost high-volume 
users => must increase charges for flat rate tariffs, or 
respond likewise with two-part tariff
OECD EVIDENCE (2009)
Countries that started with two-part tariffs (capped 
plans) have largely maintained them
– Australia, Belgium, Canada, Iceland, Luxembourg, New 
Zealand, Slovakia
Capped plans are starting to emerge in some countries 
where flat-rate tariffs once prevailed
– increase in the percentage of capped plans on ADSL 2006-8
– appear to be offered on low-speed plans (UK, US)
– but fibre connections rarely capped
Flat-rate tariffs more likely to prevail if cable operators 
were offering flat-rate plans initially
– co-ordinated strategic action?
CONCLUSION
Flat-rate broadband tariffs are a phenomenon of an 
early-stage technology
• still diffusing
• usage growing as new applications developed 
Unlikely to survive as technology, demand mature
• competition, asymmetric usage patterns will lead to tariff 
differentiation
Tariff structure implicated in a supply-side driven 
investment in faster technologies ahead of consumer 
demand, willingness to pay
• speed used as a proxy to separate out high-valuers for the 
practice of priced discrimination
• possible only because of collective strategic market power
• unlikely to be a stable tariff structure long-term
